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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Eugenio Caliz-Bautista appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury 
verdict finding him guilty of sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen.  
Caliz-Bautista argues the district court abused its discretion when it granted the 
state’s motion to exclude his expert’s testimony because the expert testimony 
was speculative and would not assist the jury.    
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 
E.M. was eleven years old and in the fifth grade.  (5/18/16 Tr., p. 167, 
Ls. 4-7.)  Caliz-Bautista was dating E.M.’s mother.  (5/18/16 Tr., p. 143, Ls. 8-
17.)  E.M. was at home taking care of the younger kids.  (5/18/16 Tr., p. 168, L. 8 
– p. 170, L. 6.)  E.M. was in her bedroom when Caliz-Bautista knocked on the 
door and started talking to her.  (5/18/16 Tr., p. 170, L. 7 – p. 173, L. 9.)  E.M. 
tried to close the door so he could not come in, but Caliz-Bautista pushed the 
door open.  (Id.)  E.M. went to the other side of her bedroom, but Caliz-Bautista 
followed her.  (Id.)  E.M. was scared.  (Id.)   
Caliz-Bautista pushed E.M. towards her bed.  (5/18/16 Tr., p. 177, L. 19 – 
p. 182, L. 6.)  Caliz-Bautista then checked to see if anyone was coming and shut 
the bedroom door.  (Id.)  He pushed E.M. down on the bed.  (Id.)  He started 
talking off E.M.’s clothes.  (Id.)  E.M. told him, “No.”  (Id.)  Caliz-Bautista took off 
his pants and started touching E.M.’s vagina with his hands and with his penis.  
(Id.)  He also licked E.M.’s breast.  (Id.)   
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Caliz-Bautista stopped when he got a phone call.  (Id.)  When Caliz-Bautista left 
the room, he told E.M. that they would do it again.  (Id.)   
When E.M. saw that Caliz-Bautista went outside the house, she locked 
the doors and windows and called her older sister, Erika.  (5/18/16 Tr., p. 182, 
L. 23 – p. 184, L. 3.)  Caliz-Bautista tried, but could not get back into the house.  
(5/18/16 Tr., p. 184, Ls. 8-21.)  E.M. told Erika to come home because Caliz-
Bautista was making her do things she did not want to do.  (5/18/16 Tr., p. 182, 
L. 23 – p. 184, L. 3.)  E.M. was crying.  (Id.)  Erika called their mother and the 
police.  (5/18/16 Tr., p. 184, Ls. 4-7.)  The state charged Caliz-Bautista with lewd 
conduct with a minor under sixteen years of age and sexual abuse of a child 
under the age of sixteen years.  (R., pp. 58-59.)   
As part of the investigation, the state collected DNA evidence.  (See R., 
pp. 182-185.)  The DNA analysis found that saliva recovered from E.M.’s breast 
matched Caliz-Bautista’s DNA.  (Id.)  The district court granted Caliz-Bautista’s 
motion to appoint a DNA expert and appointed Dr. Hampikian.  (See R., pp. 76-
87, 89-94, 183.)   
The state served discovery requesting that Caliz-Bautista provide a written 
summary or report of Dr. Hampikian’s opinions and the facts and the data he 
used in formulating those opinions.  (See R., pp. 115-116.)  Caliz-Bautista did 
not provide a report, but instead provided a paragraph stating that Dr. Hampikian 
would testify about lab protocols and about the possibility of contamination.  (See 
R., pp. 117-118.)   
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The state filed a Motion in Limine Re: DNA Opinion and a Motion in 
Limine Re: Lab Protocols seeking to exclude Dr. Hampikian from testifying 
because his proposed testimony was speculative and unsupported by facts.  
(See R., pp. 120-123, 128-135.)  The state argued that Dr. Hampikian’s 
“testimony is speculative, conjecture and unsupported by any facts and 
accordingly would not be of assistance to the jury in rendering its verdict. 
Defendant’s proffered expert did not visit the Idaho State lab, has not observed 
the operations and procedures utilized by said lab’s personnel, did not conduct 
any independent tests on any of the DNA samples collected in this case, and 
was not present to observe the testing of the DNA in this case.”  (See id.)    
The state also filed a Motion in Limine to exclude Dr. Hampikian’s 
testimony because Caliz-Bautista failed to provide a written summary or report of 
Dr. Hampikian’s opinion as required by the Idaho Rules of Evidence and the 
discovery rules.  (See R., pp. 124-125, 128-135.)   
The state supported its motions with affidavits and documents showing 
that there was no factual basis for Dr. Hampikian’s assertion that samples were 
“open” at the same time.  (See R., pp. 149-154, 157-173.)  Instead of producing 
a report of Dr. Hampikian’s opinion, and a factual basis for that opinion, counsel 
for Caliz-Bautista listed the topics on which Dr. Hampikian may testify. 
(R., pp. 138-148.)  Caliz-Bautista filed supplemental expert witness disclosures 
which attached some of the state lab documents with some portions highlighted.  
(R., pp. 175-181, 191-193.)  The state filed another affidavit and objection 
explaining that there was no way to determine how highlighted portions of the lab 
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documents supported the proposed offer of proof.  (R., pp. 194-208.)  Prior to 
trial, the state filed motions in limine again seeking to exclude Dr. Hampikian’s 
testimony because Caliz-Bautista still had not provided a report containing 
Dr. Hampikian’s opinions.  (See R., pp. 238-239.) 
During the hearing on the state’s motions in limine, counsel for Caliz-
Bautista explained that Dr. Hampikian could not testify within a reasonable 
degree of scientific certainty that contamination actually occurred in this case.  
(5/9/16 Tr., p. 25, Ls. 16-24.)  Caliz-Bautista admitted that Dr. Hampikian’s 
testimony would not be helpful to the jury if Dr. Hampikian could not testify to a 
reasonable degree of scientific certainty that contamination could occur.  (5/9/16 
Tr., p. 26, Ls. 2-16.)  Counsel for Caliz-Bautista also explained the defense was 
having trouble communicating with Dr. Hampikian.  (5/9/16 Tr. p. 26, Ls. 2-22.)  
The district court issued a memorandum decision granting the state’s 
motion in limine to exclude Dr. Hampikian’s testimony.  (R., pp. 182-189.)  The 
district court explained that Caliz-Bautista conceded that the defense expert 
could not testify that contamination actually occurred.  (See R., p. 185.)   
The defense seemed to concede that their expert could not testify 
to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty that contamination of 
the DNA samples occurred.   
 
(Id.)  The district court also noted that Caliz-Bautista failed to explain the factual 
or documentary basis for his expert’s assertion that there was a possibility of 
contamination.  (See R., p. 187, n. 3.)   
Counsel has provided no explanation from the expert as to how this 
documentation demonstrates that the samples were open at the 
same time in the laboratory and the Court’s review of that 
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documentation does not show an explanation on the face of the 
documentation itself.   
 
(Id.)  Despite holding that Dr. Hampikain’s testimony would not be admissible the 
district court provided Caliz-Bautista with a further opportunity to lay foundation 
for Dr. Hampikian’s testimony via an offer of proof at trial.  (See R., pp. 188-189.)   
At trial, E.M. testified that Caliz-Bautista touched her vagina with his 
hands, penetrated her vagina with his penis and licked her breast.  (5/18/16 Tr., 
p. 177, L. 19 – p. 182, L. 6.)  E.M. also testified that Caliz-Bautista grabbed her 
vagina, over her clothes, all of the time.  (5/18/16 Tr., p. 176, L. 18 – p. 177, 
L. 15.)  Hilda Ruela, E.M.’s mother, testified that she called Caliz-Bautista and 
asked, “What have you done to my daughter?”  (5/18/16 Tr., p. 245, L. 10 – 
p. 246, L. 21.)  Before Ms. Ruela even told Caliz-Bautista what she was talking 
about, Caliz-Bautista told her that she was crazy.  (Id.)  When Ms. Ruela got 
home, E.M. was crying and was very scared.  (5/18/16 Tr., p. 248, Ls. 2-11.)   
Rylene Nowlin, the forensic laboratory manager at the Idaho State Police 
(“ISP”) lab, testified.  (5/19/16 Tr., p. 399, L. 9 – p. 400, L. 9.)  She testified there 
was no indication that contamination occurred in this case.  (5/19/16 Tr., p. 456, 
Ls. 9-14.)  She also testified that Caliz-Bautista’s DNA was found on the saliva 
sample obtained from E.M.’s left breast.  (5/19/16 Tr., p. 429, L. 23 – p. 430, 
L. 2.)   
Out of the presence of the jury, Dr. Hampikian provided an offer of proof.  
Caliz-Bautista clarified that the defense was seeking to introduce 
Dr. Hampikian’s testimony for impeachment purposes.  (5/20/16 Tr., p. 459, 
Ls. 6-21.)  Dr. Hampikian testified that it was his belief, based upon the 
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extraction worksheet, that the DNA samples were pulled out of the refrigerator 
and the testing of the samples in this case was all done at the same time.  
(5/20/16 Tr., p. 462, L. 6 – p. 464, L. 19.)  Dr. Hampikian explained that his 
concern was that if the unknown DNA sample and the known DNA sample were 
out of the refrigerator at the same time there could have been contamination 
because they existed in the same space.  (5/20/16 Tr., p. 475, L. 22 – p. 476, 
L. 9, p. 484, Ls. 10-17.)   
However, he conceded that he did not know whether any contamination 
had actually occurred and conceded the negative controls did not show any 
contamination.  (5/20/16 Tr., p. 465, L. 22 – p. 466, L. 8.)   
Q. To clarify, Dr. Hampikian, you’re not saying contamination did or 
didn’t occur in this case. 
 
A. I can’t say. 
 
(5/20/16 Tr., p. 478, Ls. 18-21.)  Dr. Hampikian also conceded that he was not 
present in the ISP lab for any of the testing done in this case.  (5/20/16 Tr., 
p. 471, L. 25 – p. 472, L. 4.)  Nor at any time did Dr. Hampikian observe the 
processes used by the ISP lab personnel when they tested DNA.  (5/20/16 Tr., 
p. 472, Ls. 5-24.)  Nor could he even testify that it was more probable than not 
contamination occurred.  (5/20/16 Tr., p. 480, Ls. 9-12.)   
THE COURT: So you would not be able to testify on a more 
probable than not basis that contamination occurred in this case? 
 
THE WITNESS: That’s correct. 
 
(Id.)   
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 Nor could he testify that the ISP crime lab failed to follow proper 
procedures.  Dr. Hampikian testified that the practices and procedures of the ISP 
crime lab manual recommend putting down clean paper and changing gloves 
when testing different DNA samples, but he did not have any evidence that these 
procedures were not followed in this case.  (5/20/16 Tr., p. 480, L. 13 – p. 481, 
L. 19.)   
THE COURT: In terms of the clean paper, the changing of gloves, 
the cleanliness of the instruments, do you have any information 
that those requirements were not followed? 
 
THE WITNESS: I do not. 
 
(5/20/16 Tr., p. 481, Ls. 15-19.)   Nor could Dr. Hampikian even testify that when 
the samples were out of the refrigerator they were “open” at the same time.  
(5/20/16 Tr., p. 484, Ls. 10-17.)   
THE COURT: Do you have any information that once the evidence 
sample was placed in that tube that that tube was open and not 
sealed when the suspect sample was opened for the cutting? 
 
THE WITNESS: The evidence would be that they were out at the 
same time. I have no proof that they were open at the same time, if 
I’m using the terms correctly. 
 
(5/20/16 Tr., p. 484, Ls. 10-17.)   
After considering Dr. Hampikian’s offer of proof, the district court 
determined that Dr. Hampikian’s proposed testimony was inadmissible.  (See 
5/20/16 Tr., p. 540, L. 23 – p. 542, L. 21.)  The district court found 
Dr. Hampikian’s testimony was “speculative at best,” “would only invite 
conjecture,” and “would not be of assistance to the jury.”  (5/20/16 Tr., p. 536, 
L. 9 – p. 542, L. 21.)  The district court also found that Caliz-Bautista’s expert 
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disclosures failed to comply with Idaho Criminal Rule 16 and the Rules of 
Evidence.  (5/20/16 Tr., p. 539, L. 22 – p. 540, L. 9.)  The district court granted 
the state’s motion in limine to exclude Dr. Hampikian’s proposed testimony.  
(5/20/16 Tr., p. 542, Ls. 13-21.)   
The jury found Caliz-Bautista guilty of sexual abuse of a child under the 
age of sixteen, but found him not guilty of lewd conduct.  (R., p. 338; 5/20/16 Tr., 
p. 580, Ls. 5-18.)  The district court entered judgment and sentenced Caliz-
Bautista to 15 years with five years fixed.  (R., pp. 356-359.)  Caliz-Bautista 
timely appealed.  (R., pp. 363-367.)   
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ISSUE 
 
Caliz-Bautista states the issue on appeal as: 
 
Did the district court err, and violate Caliz-Bautista’s constitutional 
right to present evidence in his defense, when it prevented 
Dr. Hampikian from testifying because contamination had been 
placed into issue by the State? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 7.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
 Has Caliz-Bautista failed to show the district court abused its discretion 
when it granted the state’s motion in limine to exclude Dr. Hampikian’s testimony 
because his proposed testimony was speculative and would not assist the jury?   
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ARGUMENT 
 
The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Determining That 
Dr. Hampikian’s Proposed Testimony Was Based Upon Speculation And 
Would Not Assist The Jury 
 
A. Introduction 
 Dr. Hampikian did not have any evidence that any contamination occurred 
in this case.  (See 5/20/16 Tr., p. 478, Ls. 18-21.)  Nor could he testify that it was 
probable that contamination had occurred.  (See 5/20/16 Tr., p. 480, Ls. 9-12).  
Nor could he testify that the ISP lab failed to follow its policies and procedures 
for properly handling DNA samples.  (5/20/16 Tr., p. 480, L. 13 – p. 481, L. 19.)  
Dr. Hampikian’s testimony was speculative, unsubstantiated by facts, and would 
not have been helpful to the jury.  The district court did not abuse its discretion 
when it granted the state’s motion in limine to exclude his testimony.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
“The decision to allow or exclude expert testimony is within the discretion 
of the trial court and will not be set aside absent a showing of abuse of 
discretion.”  State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 853, 26 P.3d 31, 36 (2001) (citing 
State v. Faught, 127 Idaho 873, 875, 908 P.2d 566, 568 (1995); State v. Crea, 
119 Idaho 352, 353, 806 P.2d 445, 446 (1991)).  
In reviewing the trial court’s exercise of discretion, the appellate court 
must determine whether the trial court: “(1) correctly perceived the issue as one 
involving the exercise of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its 
discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific 
choices it had; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason.”  Id. (citing 
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State v. Powell, 125 Idaho 889, 891, 876 P.2d 587, 589 (1994); State v. Hedger, 
115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989)). 
 
C. Dr. Hampikian’s Proposed Testimony Was Speculative And The District 
Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Granting The State’s Motion In 
Limine To Exclude His Testimony  
 
During the offer of proof, Dr. Hampikian testified that he did not know if 
any contamination occurred.  (5/20/16 Tr., p. 478, Ls. 18-21.)  He admitted he 
could not testify whether it was more probable than not any contamination 
occurred.  (5/20/16 Tr., p. 480, Ls. 9-12.)  Further, he conceded that he did not 
have any evidence that the ISP lab failed to follow proper procedures for 
handling DNA samples, such as putting down clean paper and changing gloves 
when testing different DNA samples.  (5/20/16 Tr., p. 480, L. 13 – p. 481, L. 19.)  
The district court determined that Dr. Hampikian’s proposed testimony was 
inadmissible because it was “speculative at best,” “would only invite conjecture,” 
and “would not be of assistance to the jury.”  (5/20/16 Tr., p. 536, L. 9 – p. 542, 
L. 21.)   
On appeal, Caliz-Bautista argues that the district court violated Caliz-
Bautista’s fundamental right to present a defense because, he claims, 
Dr. Hampikian’s testimony was relevant as both substantive evidence and 
impeachment evidence.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-15.)  Caliz-Bautista’s 
arguments are not supported by the record or the law. 
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1. The District Court’s Determination To Exclude Evidence Is An 
Evidentiary Issue, Not A Constitutional Issue 
 
On appeal Caliz-Bautista argues that the district court’s decision to grant 
the state’s motion in limine violated his Sixth Amendment right to present 
evidence at trial.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-12.)  It does not appear that Caliz-
Bautista raised this Sixth Amendment constitutional claim before the district 
court.  (See 5/9/16 Tr., p. 22, L. 20 – p. 27, L. 20; 5/20/16 Tr., p. 542, L. 23 – 
p. 543, L. 9; R., pp. 138-148, 191-193.)  Because Caliz-Bautista failed to raise 
the constitutional claim below, he cannot raise it for the first time on appeal 
unless he establishes fundamental error.  See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 
226, 245 P.3d 961, 978 (2010).  However, on appeal, Caliz-Bautista has made 
no argument asserting or establishing fundamental error.  Therefore his 
constitutional claim, raised for the first time on appeal, fails.   
Even if his claim is considered, Caliz-Bautista’s constitutional argument is 
misplaced.  The district court’s decision to exclude the testimony of 
Dr. Hampikian is reviewed under the Idaho Rules of Evidence.  In State v. 
Meister, 148 Idaho 236, 239-242, 220 P.3d 1055, 1058-1061 (2009), the Idaho 
Supreme Court explained that a defendant’s right to present evidence is subject 
to the Idaho Rules of Evidence.   
As previously stated, this Court adopts an approach which holds 
that the Rules of Evidence generally govern the admission of all 
evidence in the courts of this State. 
 
Id. at 240, 220 P.3d at 1059 (emphasis original); see also State v. Conner, 
161 Idaho 502, ___, 387 P.3d 170, 174-175 (Ct. App. 2016). 
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The Idaho Supreme Court has explained that a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to present a defense is subject to reasonable limitations, and 
the rules of evidence must be complied with to assure both fairness and 
reliability in the ascertainment of guilt or innocence.  State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 
520, 523, 81 P.3d 1230, 1233 (2003).   
A defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to present evidence is 
fundamental; however, this right is subject to reasonable 
limitations.  The exclusion of evidence does not impair the 
defendant’s right “to present a defense so long as they are not 
‘arbitrary’ or ‘disproportionate to the purposes they serve.’”  The 
exclusion is “unconstitutionally arbitrary or disproportionate only 
where it has infringed upon a weighty interest of the accused.”  
With the exercise of the defendant’s right to present evidence, the 
rules of procedure and evidence must be complied with to assure 
both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt or 
innocence.  
 
Id. (internal citations omitted).   
 
The United States Supreme Court has determined that excluding 
evidence pursuant to evidentiary rules does not violate the Sixth Amendment 
right to present a defense so long as the evidentiary rules are not “arbitrary” or 
“disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve.”  United States v. 
Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998) (citations omitted).  Caliz-Bautista has not 
argued, nor could he show, that the Idaho Rules of Evidence are “arbitrary” or 
“disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve.”   
The Idaho Supreme Court has explained that the Idaho Rules of Evidence 
“embody the balancing test which safeguards a defendant’s constitutional right to 
present a defense along with protection of the state’s interest in the integrity of 
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the criminal trial process.”  Meister, 148 Idaho at 239-242, 220 P.3d at 1058-
1061. 
Meister should be afforded the opportunity to present his complete 
and full defense, which includes the presentation of all relevant 
evidence in the context of trial pursuant to any limitations of the 
Idaho Rules of Evidence. 
 
Id. at 241, 220 P.3d at 1060 (emphasis added).   
 
 Caliz-Bautista claims that his Sixth Amendment right to present a defense 
fails.  As explained above, Caliz-Bautista failed to raise this constitutional claim 
before the district court and has failed to argue, let alone establish, fundamental 
error on appeal.  Further, the right to present a defense is subject to the Idaho 
Rules of Evidence and, thus, the question for this Court on appeal is whether the 
district court abused its discretion when it granted the state’s motion in limine.  
This is an evidentiary question, not a constitutional one.   
 
2. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Determined 
That Dr. Hampikian’s Testimony Was Speculative And Not Likely 
To Assist The Jury 
 
 On appeal, Caliz-Bautista argues the district court erred in requiring 
Dr. Hampikian to provide “a definitive and quantifiable expression of risk of 
contamination as a prerequisite of admission under I.R.E. 702[.]”  (Appellant’s 
brief, pp. 11-12.)  Caliz-Bautista’s argument fails.  The district court did not abuse 
its discretion when it found that Dr. Hampikian’s testimony was speculative and  
not likely to assist the jury.   
“Expert opinion must be based upon a proper factual foundation.”  
Bromley v. Garey, 132 Idaho 807, 811, 979 P.2d 1165, 1169 (1999).  “Expert 
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opinion which is speculative, conclusory, or unsubstantiated by facts in the 
record is of no assistance to the jury in rendering its verdict, and therefore is 
inadmissible as evidence under Rule 702.”  Id. (quoting Ryan v. Beisner, 
123 Idaho 42, 46, 844 P.2d 24, 28 (Ct. App. 1992)).  “An expert opinion that 
merely suggests possibilities, not probabilities, would only invite conjecture and 
may be properly excluded.”  Nield v. Pocatello Health Servs., Inc., 156 Idaho 
802, 815, 332 P.3d 714, 727 (2014) (citing Slack v. Kelleher, 140 Idaho 916, 
923, 104 P.3d 958, 965 (2004)). 
Here, Dr. Hampikian’s proposed testimony was speculative, only 
suggested possibilities that would invite conjecture, and would not assist the jury.  
Dr. Hampikian proposed to testify that there could be a possibility of 
contamination because the samples were out of the refrigerator at the same 
time.  (5/20/16 Tr., p. 462, L. 6 – p. 464, L. 19.)  Idaho case law holds that when 
an expert purports to only offer a “possibility” without offering any “probabilities” 
that expert’s testimony is speculative.   
In Bromley v. Garey, supra, Garey’s shotgun fell onto the bed of the 
pickup, discharged and injured Bromley.  132 Idaho at 809, 979 P.2d at 1167.  
Bromely sued Garey.  Id.  Bromley had a gun expert examine the shotgun.  Id.  
The gun expert “observed that when the bolt was slammed shut or when the 
shotgun was hit on its butt or on the sides, it would fire ninety percent of the 
time.”  Id.  The gun expert formulated several different possibilities why the 
shotgun discharged.  Id.  In response to a summary judgment motion, Bromley 
sought to have the gun expert’s opinions regarding the shotgun admitted into 
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evidence.  Id. at 811, 979 at 1169.  The district court excluded the gun expert’s 
opinion because it was speculative and lacked the proper factual foundation.  Id.  
The Court of Appeals agreed.  Id.   
The Court of Appeals held that the gun expert’s opinion was speculative, 
because the gun expert never actually took the shotgun apart and he only 
suggested different possibilities and never indicated which possibility he thought 
actually occurred or was the most probable.  Id. at 811-812, 979 at 1169-1170.   
[The gun expert] examined the shotgun shortly after the accident. 
He observed that the shotgun fired when the bolt was slammed 
shut and when the shotgun was hit on the butt or on the sides, but 
never took the gun apart or performed anything other than an 
external examination. Based on his observations, [the gun expert] 
stated several possible reasons for the malfunction: a bad shear 
pin, a loose screw, a bad spring, flakes of unburned powder, a 
weed or stick, or “countless things.” [The gun expert] never 
indicated which of these possibilities he thought had occurred or 
even said which was most probable. [The gun expert] merely 
recited several things that would be consistent with his 
observations. 
 
Given the lack of an internal examination and the purely 
speculative nature of [the gun expert’s] testimony, the district court 
did not abuse its discretion by refusing to admit [the gun expert’s]  
opinions. 
 
Id.   
Here, Dr. Hampikian did even less examination than the gun expert in 
Bromley.  Dr. Hampikian did not visit the lab, nor did he talk to the workers at the 
lab, nor did he have any idea what the lab workers actually did when they were 
testing the DNA sample.  Further, like the gun expert, Dr. Hampikian only 
discussed possibilities and did not provide not testimony about what actually 
occurred or even what most probably occurred.   
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 Dr. Hampikian made errors similar to those made by the expert in Nield v. 
Pocatello Health Servs., Inc., supra.  In Nield, the Idaho Supreme Court held that 
it was error for the district court to not rule on the plaintiff’s objections to 
Dr. Coffman’s affidavit.  Id.  The Idaho Supreme Court pointed out that  
Dr. Coffman’s opinion was unsubstantiated by facts in the record and contained 
speculation.  See Id.  Dr. Coffman opined, in part, that contrary to the 
handwritten note in the patient’s file, a “MRSA screen” was not performed 
because he reviewed the “records available” and did not find a “report of the 
[MRSA] screen.”  Id.  Dr. Coffman’s opinion was based on a “guess” that the 
handwritten note was in error.  Id.  The Idaho Supreme Court stated, “A simple 
telephone call to Dr. Zimmerman, the author of the note, might have sufficed to 
definitely answer the question.”  Id.   
The same is true here.  Dr. Hampikian looked at the ISP lab records and 
guessed that the samples were open at the same time.  And as the district court 
pointed out, Dr. Hampikian failed to consult with the state lab in preparation of 
his testimony.  (5/20/16 Tr., p. 542, Ls. 1-4 (“I know of no reason as to why 
[Dr. Hampikian] could not have consulted with the state lab in preparation for his 
testimony here today, and that did not occur.”).)   
 In Nield, the expert, Dr. Coffman, also opined as to the potential sources 
of infection.  156 Idaho at 814-815, 332 P.3d at 726-727.  However, Dr. Coffman 
was unable to say whether the patient actually contracted the infection from any 
of these possible sources.  Id.  Dr. Coffman was also unable to show these 
possibilities were “founded upon or related to actual facts in the record.”  Id.   
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The same is true of Dr. Hampikian.  Dr. Hampikian only suggested there 
was a possibility of contamination because the samples could have been open at 
the same time, but then admitted that he did not know whether the samples were 
actually open at the same time.  (See, e.g., 5/20/16 Tr., p. 484, Ls. 10-17 (“I 
have no proof that they were open at the same time, if I’m using the terms 
correctly.”).)  Dr. Hampikian’s opinion, like that of Dr. Coffman, is speculative and 
unsubstantiated by the facts in the record.   
In addition, Caliz-Bautista’s argument on appeal, that Dr. Hampikian 
should not have been required to provide a quantifiable risk of contamination, 
runs counter to his statements to the district court.  Counsel for Caliz-Bautista 
agreed that Dr. Hampikian’s testimony would not be helpful to the jury if 
Dr. Hampikian could not testify to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty that 
contamination actually occurred.  (5/9/16 Tr. p. 26, Ls. 2-16.)   
THE COURT: So he’s only going to testify that it is possible that 
there was contamination in the case? 
 
MS. DEPEW: That’s correct. 
 
THE COURT: How is that helpful to the jury if he cannot testify to a 
reasonable degree of scientific certainty that contamination did 
occur? 
 
MS. DEPEW: And I would agree with that, Judge. And part of the 
question I’ve been trying to ask him to fill in that blank, and I don’t 
have an answer to, is whether or not, in his opinion, the way this 
was done in this case contaminated to the point where re-testing is 
not possible, if that’s why he made the decision not to do the re-
testing, and I haven’t been able to get an answer. 
 
(Id.)   
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Further, Dr. Hampikian’s inability to quantify the likelihood of 
contamination in this case was only one of the reasons the district court excluded 
his testimony.  (5/20/16 Tr., p. 540, L. 23 – 542, L. 21.)  After listening to 
Dr. Hampikian’s offer of proof, the district court found there were no facts in the 
record to support Dr. Hampikian’s opinion regarding potential contamination.     
Certainly, after considering the testimony of Dr. Hampikian, it does 
appear that there -- in the case that there is no evidence or 
testimony that the biological evidence as collected was 
contaminated during the collection process.  There is no evidence 
or testimony that the biological evidence was contaminated during 
the biological testing or the amylase process. 
 
(5/20/16 Tr., p. 537, Ls. 7-14.)   
But at all times when those items were transmitted, whether they 
were or were not transmitted with the sexual assault kit, all of [the] 
evidence indicates those items remained sealed. There was no 
break in the seal. And certainly there was no evidence in the record 
that any contamination occurred during the process of delivery 
between law enforcement and the state lab. 
 
(5/20/16 Tr., p. 538, Ls. 8-15.)   
Further, the district court found that Dr. Hampikian’s testimony was 
speculative and unsupported by the facts because his testimony was based 
upon an incomplete understanding of the “whole story,” and he did not have any 
evidence that the lab violated any of its standards and procedures.  (See 5/20/16 
Tr., p. 540, L. 23 – p. 542, L. 21.)   
Dr. Hampikian himself testified -- or in response to my questions 
did testify that he cannot quantify the likelihood of contamination in 
this case and cannot say on a more probable than not basis that 
contamination occurred in this case. And, certainly, I understand 
that Dr. Hampikian’s testimony to be offered is essentially limited to 
the records that he has reviewed from the state lab; however, it’s 
clear from those records that those records do not tell the whole 
story. Certainly, Dr. Hampikian -- I know of no reason as to why he 
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could not have consulted with the state lab in preparation for his 
testimony here today, and that did not occur. 
 
Dr. Hampikian has indicated some familiarity with the testing 
procedures at the state lab, and while I recognize that it’s, perhaps, 
not uncommon that other labs may do things differently, that’s not 
to suggest that the Idaho State Lab did not perform these tests in 
accordance with the standards and processes for which they are 
accredited and approved. 
 
And for those reasons, the Court finds, based on the offer of proof, 
that the testimony of Dr. Hampikian to be presented is speculative 
at best, that that would only invite conjecture, and for that reason, 
the Court would find that the testimony of Dr. Hampikian would not 
be of assistance to the jury, and the Court would grant the State’s 
motion at this time to exclude the testimony of Dr. Hampikian. 
 
(Id.)   
 Dr. Hampikian’s proposed testimony was speculative, unsubstantiated by 
the facts, only suggested possibilities that would invite conjecture, and would not 
be helpful to the jury.  Caliz-Bautista has failed to show the district court abused 
its discretion.   
 
3. The Testimony Was Not Admissible As Impeachment Evidence 
 
Caliz-Bautista also argues that Dr. Hampikian’s testimony “was relevant 
and admissible as impeachment evidence.”  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 12-15 
(capitalization altered).)  Caliz-Bautista argues that Dr. Hampikian’s testimony 
was relevant to impeach the state’s experts.  (See id.)  Caliz-Bautista’s argument 
fails.   
Dr. Hampikian’s testimony was not relevant to impeach the state’s 
witnesses because Dr. Hampikian did not actually have any evidence with which 
to contradict the state’s experts.  As Dr. Hampikian testified, he did not know if 
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any contamination occurred, and he did not know if the state failed to follow the 
lab’s policies and procedures.  (See 5/20/16 Tr., p. 478, Ls. 18-21, p. 480, L. 13 
– p. 481, L. 19.)  Therefore, his testimony was not relevant for impeachment 
purposes because nothing in his offer of proof would actually contradict or 
impeach the testimony of the state’s experts.  Here, as explained above, 
Dr. Hampikian’s testimony was speculative, unsubstantiated by facts in the 
record, and would not be helpful to the jury.  Even if it was relevant for 
impeachment, it would not be admissible.  The district court did not abuse its 
discretion.   
 
4. Even If The District Court Abused Its Discretion, The Error Was 
Harmless 
 
Dr. Hampikian’s testimony was speculative, only suggested possibilities 
that invited conjecture, and would not be helpful to the jury.  The district court did 
not abuse its discretion when it granted the state’s motion in limine to exclude his 
testimony.  However, even if the district court abused its discretion, that error 
was harmless.  “A defendant appealing from an objected-to, non-constitutionally-
based error shall have the duty to establish that such an error occurred, at which 
point the State shall have the burden of demonstrating that the error is harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Perry, 150 Idaho at 222, 245 P.3d at 974.  “Where 
a defendant alleges error at trial that he contemporaneously objected to, this 
Court reviews the error on appeal under the harmless error test.”  State v. 
Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 600-01, 301 P.3d 242, 258-259 (2013) (citation 
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omitted).  “[T]he error is harmless if the Court finds that the result would be the 
same without the error.”  Id. at 598, 301 P.3d at 256 (citation omitted).   
Here, the result would have been the same because the district court 
would have excluded Dr. Hampikian’s testimony because Caliz-Bautista failed to 
comply with disclosure requirements of the Idaho Rules of Evidence and 
discovery.  (See 5/20/16 Tr., p. 539, L. 22 – p. 540, L. 9.)  Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 705 allows an expert to testify regarding his or her opinion, provided, 
that “if requested pursuant to the rules of discovery the underlying facts or data 
were disclosed.”  I.R.E. 705.  Idaho Criminal Rule 16 requires, that upon written 
request of the prosecutor, the defense must produce expert witness opinions 
and the facts and data for those opinions.  I.C.R. 16(c)(4).  
The state filed a motion to exclude Dr. Hampikian’s testimony because 
Caliz-Bautista failed to provide a written summary or report of Dr. Hampikian’s 
opinion as required by the Idaho Rules of Evidence and the discovery requests.  
(See R., pp. 124-125, 128-135.)  The state explained that Caliz-Bautista’s failure 
to comply with the discovery rules resulted in the state’s inability to have its own 
expert review the opinion and “the State will be unfairly prejudiced by the late 
disclosure of said report.”  (R., pp. 124-125; see also R., p. 133 (letter to defense 
counsel explaining that late disclosure of Dr. Hampikian’s opinion was risking the 
ability of the trial to go forward as scheduled).)  The district court agreed that 
Caliz-Bautista’s expert witness disclosures failed to comply with the Idaho Rules 
of Evidence and Idaho Criminal Rule 16.  (5/20/16 Tr., p. 539, L. 22 – p. 540, 
L. 9.)   
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Whether to exclude a defense witness for late disclosure is within the 
discretion of the trial court.  State v. Siegel, 137 Idaho 538, 543, 50 P.3d 1033, 
1038 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing State v. Harris, 132 Idaho 843, 847, 979 P.2d 1201, 
1205 (1999); State v. Lamphere, 130 Idaho 630, 633, 945 P.2d 1, 4 (1997)).  “In 
exercising its discretion, ‘the trial court must consider whether the State would be 
prejudiced from the late disclosure if the evidence were admitted and weigh that 
prejudice against the defendant’s right to a fair trial.’”  Id. (citing State v. Thomas, 
133 Idaho 800, 802, 992 P.2d 795, 797 (Ct. App. 1999)).  The prejudice resulting 
from late disclosure may be greater when the witness is an expert.  See Siegel, 
137 Idaho at 543, 50 P.3d at 1038 (citing State v. Miller, 133 Idaho 454, 457, 988 
P.2d 680, 683 (1999)).   
The district court ruled that Caliz-Bautista’s expert witness disclosures 
regarding Dr. Hampikian did not comply with the Idaho Rules of Evidence and 
Idaho Criminal Rule 16.  (5/20/16 Tr., p. 539, L. 22 – p. 540, L. 9.)  In a footnote, 
Caliz-Bautista argues that the district court’s finding that he violated the 
discovery rules was not sufficient to exclude Dr. Hampikian’s testimony because 
the district court did not make a specific finding as to the potential prejudice to 
the state or alternative remedies to exclusion.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 13-14, 
n. 2.)  Contrary to Caliz-Bautista’s argument, the district court had sufficient 
evidence in the record that his failure to comply with discovery requests 
prejudiced the state.   
The state moved to exclude Dr. Hampikian’s testimony, in part, on the 
grounds the state was unable to properly prepare for trial due to Caliz-Bautista’s 
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failure to disclose an expert opinion, and basis for that opinion.  (See R., 
pp. 124-125.)  In its ruling the district court noted that the disclosure 
requirements are in place so that a party can properly prepare for trial.  (5/20/16 
Tr., p. 539, L. 22 – p. 540, L. 9.) 
Certainly, under Rule 16, when a discovery request is directed to 
expert testimony, the rule specifically requires that the opinions to 
be expressed by an expert are to be disclosed, together with the 
facts and data upon which the expert relies. And that applies to 
both sides so both sides can be prepared to know what the 
opinions of an expert are going to be so as both sides may properly 
prepare. I would first note that I do believe, in my considered 
opinion, that the defense’s disclosures at this time do not comply 
with 702, 703, and 705 or within the contemplation of Rule 16. 
 
(Id.)  The district court had a basis for finding the state was prejudiced by the 
lack of a disclosure.  Thus any error in excluding Dr. Hampikian’s testimony 
because it was speculative would have been harmless because Dr. Hampikian’s 
testimony would have been excluded for failing to comply with the Idaho Rules of 
Evidence and the Idaho Criminal Rules.   
 Even if Dr. Hampikian’s testimony had ultimately been admitted at trial, it 
would not have changed the outcome of the trial.  E.M. testified that Caliz-
Bautista licked her breast.  (5/18/16 Tr., p. 177, L. 19 – p. 182, L. 6.)  Caliz-
Bautista’s DNA was found on the sample obtained from E.M.’s left breast.  
(5/19/16 Tr., p. 429, L. 23 – p. 430, L. 2.)  Erika, E.M.’s sister, testified that E.M. 
was crying and telling her that Caliz-Bautista was making her do things she did 
not want to do.  (5/18/16 Tr., p. 182, L. 23 – p. 184, L. 3.)  E.M.’s mother also 
testified that E.M. was crying and was very scared.  (5/18/16 Tr., p. 248, Ls. 2-
11.)   
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Dr. Hampikian’s testimony would not have changed the jury’s verdict. 
Dr. Hampikian admitted that he had no idea if any contamination took place, he 
was not present for the testing, he did not observe the processes used by ISP, 
he had no evidence that the ISP lab failed to follow its policies and procedures, 
and he had no evidence that the DNA samples were even open at the same 
time.  (See 5/20/16 Tr., p. 465, L. 22 – p. 466, L. 8, p. 471, L. 25 – p. 472, L. 4, 
p. 472, Ls. 5-24, p. 478, Ls. 18-21, p. 480, L. 13 – p. 481, L. 19, p. 484, Ls. 10-
17.)  Dr. Hampikian could not even testify that it was more probable than not 
contamination occurred.  (5/20/16 Tr., p. 480, Ls. 9-12.)   
THE COURT: So you would not be able to testify on a more 
probable than not basis that contamination occurred in this case? 
 
THE WITNESS: That’s correct. 
 
(Id.)  And, as Caliz-Bautista conceded, if Dr. Hampikian could not testify to a 
reasonable degree of scientific certainty that contamination actually occurred, 
then his testimony would not be helpful to a jury.  (5/9/16 Tr. p. 26, Ls. 2-16.)  
Even if it were error to exclude Dr. Hampikian’s testimony, the error was 
harmless.   
CONCLUSION 
 The state respectfully requests this Court affirm Caliz-Bautista’s 
conviction.   
 DATED this 1st day of June, 2017. 
 
 
      _/s/ Ted S. Tollefson________ 
      TED S. TOLLEFSON 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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